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stoicisM in Berkeley’s PhilosoPhy
aBstract 
Commentators have not said much regarding Berkeley and Stoicism. Even 
when they do, they generally limit their remarks to Berkeley’s Siris (1744) 
where he invokes characteristically Stoic themes about the World Soul, 
“seminal reasons,” and the animating fire of the universe. The Stoic heritage 
of other Berkeleian doctrines (e.g., about mind or the semiotic character of 
nature) is seldom recognized, and when it is, little is made of it in explaining 
his other doctrines (e.g., immaterialism). None of this is surprising, consid-
ering how Stoics are considered arch-materialists and determinists. My aim 
is to suggest that our understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy is improved 
significantly by acknowledging its underlying Stoic character. I argue that 
Berkeley proposes not only a semantic ontology based on assumptions of 
Stoic logic but also a doctrine in which perceptions or ideas are intelligible 
precisely because they are always embedded in the propositions of a dis-
course or language.
introduction
It is not unusual to find references to Stoic themes in accounts of Rene Des-
cartes’ ethics or Baruch Spinoza’s treatment of freedom and determinism. 
Indeed, one has to look no further than G. W. Leibniz to see how Descartes 
and Spinoza are understood as “new Stoics.”1 Recent studies have highlight-
ed how Thomas Hobbes, Leibniz, John Locke, A. A. Cooper (third Earl of 
Shaftesbury), and Joseph Butler also appropriate tenets of Stoicism – espe-
cially as developed in the Neo-Stoicism of Justus Lipsius (1547-1606).2 In 
Hobbes’s case, the Stoic contribution is most explicit when he appeals to 
1 Leibniz 1677-80, 282-283. Cf. Miller 2003, 126-35; Rutherford 2004, 178; Rutherford 
2001, 138-164; James 1993, 289-316; and Kristeller 1984, 1-7.
2 See Long 2003, 9-17, 27-28, and Moreau 1999b, 23-25.
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Lipsius to show that the Stoic concept of fate is consistent with the Christian 
doctrine that God is the necessary cause of all things.3 Locke and Shaftesbury 
appeal to Stoic ideas in developing their doctrines of virtue; and Leibniz en-
dorses the Stoic view that human beings attain happiness by acting in accord 
with the rationally ordered cosmos.4
Regarding Berkeley and Stoicism, commentators have not said much. 
Even when they do, they generally limit their remarks to Berkeley’s Siris 
where he invokes characteristically Stoic themes about the World Soul, 
“seminal reasons,” and the animating fire or ether of the universe.5 The Stoic 
heritage of other Berkeleian doctrines (e.g., about mind or the semiotic char-
acter of nature) is seldom recognized; and when it is, little is typically made 
of it in explaining features of his thought (such as immaterialism) for which 
he is most well known.6
Recently, however, Jeffrey Barnouw has argued that Berkeley’s theory 
of signs parallels the Stoic treatment of how things in the cosmos are relat-
ed.7 And Geneviève Brykman has proposed that Berkeley’s account of hu-
man freedom is similar to that of the Stoics, Shaftesbury, and even Spinoza, 
in that “for all these thinkers, liberty is connected with the comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding of nature.”8 Such interpretations are prob-
lematic, however, considering how the Stoics are commonly portrayed as 
extreme materialists and determininists – neither of which views Berkeley 
endorses.
My aim here is to indicate how the common portrait of Stoicism fails to 
acknowledge certain features that appear in Berkeley’s philosophy as well. 
Even though those features are not typically emphasized in popular accounts 
of Stoicism, they are crucial for showing how other Stoic doctrines are re-
lated to one another. By recognizing how they function in Stoic thought, we 
are better prepared to see not only how Berkeley adopts Stoic ideas but also 
3 See Hobbes 1656, 242-243. Cf. Kassler 1991, 54-55.
4 Cf. Mitsis 2003, 45-61; Rutherford 2003, 62-89; and Forman 2008, 206-211.
5 Cf. Moked, 126-127; Leduc-Fayette 1997, 414, 419; and Jacob 1991, 115. Berkeley, Siris. 
6 Cf. Bracken 1974, 137.
7 See Barnouw 2008, 170-172.
8 Brykman 2008, 243-244.
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how disparate aspects of his philosophy – from its earliest expressions about 
mathematics and the epistemology of vision to the metaphysics and cosmol-
ogy of Siris – can be understood as more unified than has previously been 
noted.
stoic iMMaterialisM
Our attending to Stoic themes in Berkeley’s philosophy has the reflexive 
effect of making us reconsider aspects of Stoicism (e.g., materialism, deter-
minism) that seem to conflict with Berkeley’s views. This reconsideration 
is important because, as Anthony Long argues, the medieval assimilation of 
Stoic doctrines in Christian ethics and theology blurs the profound differ-
ences between Stoicism and Christian thought.9 In particular, Stoic teachings 
on perception, the passions, morality, and providence are recast by medieval 
thinkers in Platonic and Aristotelian terms and divorced from the distinctive 
logical and metaphysical contexts in which those teachings are inextricably 
grounded for their intelligibility. So in the effort to Christianize Stoicism, 
medieval thinkers gloss over differences between Stoic and Platonic/Aris-
totelian ways of thinking. And it is this gloss that produces the standard un-
derstanding of Stoicism that seems so contrary to Berkeley’s immaterialism.
The appearance of Stoic themes in Berkeley’s philosophy invites us to 
reconsider not only (a) how Stoicism allows for (and even requires) recog-
nition of immaterial realities and freedom but also (b) how his Christianity 
accommodates the view expressed by the Stoic poet Aratus and repeated by 
St Paul, that in God we “live, and move, and have our being” (Acts 17:28). 
The key to this latter point lies in noting how Berkeley’s emphasis on the dis-
cursive character of nature and his rejection of abstract ideas depend on his 
appeal to a form of Stoic metaphysics (and the propositional logic underly-
ing it) rather than the metaphysics and predicate logic found in the Platonic/
Aristotelian strategies appropriated by most of his contemporaries.
Typically the default way of treating Berkeley’s metaphysics and logic is 
to claim that he at least starts with a version of Cartesian, Malebranchean, or 
Lockean metaphysics that is based on the kind of predicate logic proposed 
9 Long 2003, 8.
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in the Port Royal Logic and popularized by Locke. The problem with such 
a strategy is that it does not explain – nor does it attempt to explain – why 
Berkeley would adopt three doctrines that unite his thought: (1) The proper 
objects of perception constitute a divine language (which is what we learn 
from Berkeley’s works on vision and Alciphron); (2) that divine language is 
structured to enhance human well-being (about which we learn in the Prin-
ciples, the Three Dialogues, and De Motu); and (3) the positing of objects 
within such a law-governed framework can be understood, epistemologi-
cally, as the perception of things by which they exist and are known to exist 
(Principles and Three Dialogues), and metaphysically, as products of an 
ethereal fire that providentially orders the cosmos (about which we learn in 
Siris).
If the “traditional” way of explaining Berkeley’s philosophy fails to pro-
vide an account that can accommodate all of these points in all of his writings 
– or worse, explains their variety by dismissing his remarks as merely meta-
phorical, contradictory, or instances of his changing his mind – that should 
tell us there is something wrong with the traditional approach and that we 
need to look elsewhere for an interpretive framework to discern the unity in 
his thought. That framework, I suggest, can be found in Stoicism.
Indeed, not only does Berkeley propose a semantic ontology based on 
the assumptions that inform Stoic logic, but he also insists on a doctrine 
in which perceptions or ideas (what the Stoics call presentations, phanta-
siai) always appear embedded in an aboriginal logos, and that that is what 
Berkeley means when he claims that reality is a discourse or language. By 
describing sensations as presentations initially intelligible only in terms of 
linguistic structures, the Stoics and Berkeley thus reveal how sensations are 
experienced as always already framed in propositions in terms of which they 
are intelligible.10 Accordingly, because the strategies that guide Stoic and 
Berkeleian ethics and epistemology depend on a logic and a metaphysics 
that are inherently linguistic, they are significantly different from those de-
veloped by other contemporary thinkers.
In particular, when framed in Platonic and Aristotelian terms, Stoic doc-
trines always appear to be beside the point. The same result occurs if we at-
tempt to frame Berkeley’s views in terms of Cartesian or Lockean filters that 
10 See Imbert 1980, 185-186. Also see Daniel 2008b, 41-48, 52-53.
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do not take seriously Berkeley’s semantic ontology. So to wean ourselves 
away from the Platonic and Aristotelian preconceptions in logic and meta-
physics that underlie the Cartesian and Lockean accounts often used to “ex-
plain” Berkeley, we need to know how the logic of the Stoics (and Berkeley) 
portrays all experiences as ineradicably linguistic. Furthermore, we need to 
understand how Berkeley’s immaterialistic metaphysics is also compatible 
with Stoic metaphysics. This latter challenge is especially daunting, consid-
ering how Stoics are often portrayed as claiming that everything that exists 
is material. One of my aims, therefore, is to show that that portrayal needs 
to be qualified in such a substantive way that it loses any polemical punch 
it might have had when raised as an objection to a proposed Stoic–Berkeley 
connection.
We need to begin, then, with Stoic logic (or what the Stoics call dialec-
tics). Dialectics is the art of the discursive practices in terms of which all 
things are discernible and relatable. Since discursive practices identify what 
it means for something to be intelligible, the art of dialectics forms the basis 
or rationale for all ontological, epistemological, and affective identity and 
relations. It thus identifies the natural vocabulary, semantics, and syntax by 
which the universe of things is made accessible for experience, thought, and 
practical engagement. So in addition to being the art of rational discourse, 
dialectics is also the science of the real nature of things, because all determi-
nate, intelligible things exist and can be thought only in virtue of the discur-
sive logos or ratio (or for Berkeley, the divine language) in which they are 
originally identified as entities.11
That is why the Stoics claim that dialectics is concerned primarily with 
the incorporeal events that are expressed in and as propositions. It is also 
why (as Susanne Bobzien puts it), “Stoic logic is in its core a propositional 
logic,” for no term is intelligible apart from its being presented in a proposi-
tion.12 Furthermore, the things with which we are presented (phantasiai) are 
perceived and related to one another hypothetically, conjunctively, or dis-
junctively in virtue of utterances (lekta) that establish the limits or bounda-
ries of those things and the propositional structures on which all inferences 
11 See Long 1974, 121-122; and Long 1971b, 84. Cf. Neuchelmans 1980, 182-184.
12 Bobzien 2003, 85. Also see Mates 1961, 2.
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about those things are based.13 Because the propositional placement by which 
a thing becomes a thing is not itself a thing – just as the limit of a thing is not 
itself a thing but rather the act by which something becomes that thing – the 
lekta expressed by these events do not exist but rather “subsist.”14 Lekta are 
thus the incorporeal propositions that enable perceptions to be objects of ra-
tional assent.15 “They” have no discernible identity apart from their being the 
active principles by which the things they identify come into existence. Or in 
more explicitly Berkeleian terms: thinking (i.e., perceiving, willing) consists 
in being the act whereby certain things become identified and related to one 
another.16 Accordingly, the pattern or set of actions we describe as a mind is 
only reflexively and derivatively said to exist in virtue of the body or bodies 
it is said to perceive.
The doctrine of the lekton is the most obvious indication that the Sto-
ics definitely do not adopt a metaphysics that is exclusively materialistic. 
Indeed, the Stoics conclude that minds are material only in the sense that 
they do not exist (or more properly, “subsist”) apart from their activities of 
specifying bodies in relations. Berkeley reverses this insight by arguing that 
if the existence of bodies depends on the immaterial activity of positing the 
limits and relations whereby objects of perception are identified, then bod-
ies must be understood in immaterial terms. Both the Stoics and Berkeley 
agree, however, that minds and bodies cannot exist or be conceived apart 
from one another. Regardless of whether one calls this a form of materialism 
or immaterialism, what is significant is how Berkeley agrees with the Stoics 
in rejecting the attempt to treat minds and bodies as abstractions. To be sure, 
Berkeley rejects all forms of materialism in which determinate bodies are 
said to exist independently of mind, or in which minds and mental activities 
are considered as epiphenomena of independently existing bodies. But such 
a description does not characterize the Stoic account of mind either, in that it 
ignores how (for the Stoics as well as Berkeley) incorporeal acts determine 
the identities and relations of bodies as elements in a system of signs.
13 Imbert 1980, 182-188, 191, 211.
14 See White 2003, 150; Long 1971b, 97; and Deleuze 1990, 4-5, 19, 21.
15 See Frede 1999, 307, and Annas 1992, 76-77.
16 Cf. Daniel 2004, 165; and Daniel 2008b, 212-223.
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the inherent linguisticality of existence
No doubt, the Stoic focus on the discursive, linguistic rationale of the uni-
verse is often misunderstood in the predicate logic of substantialist metaphys-
ics either as a substitution of rhetoric for metaphysics or as a metaphorical 
guide for understanding ontological relations. So Chrysippus’ paradoxical 
remark “If you say ‘chariot’, a chariot passes through your lips” is typically 
cited in such a view as a confusion of mention and use. The question of how 
to defend the initial ontological distinction of things, ideas, and words is sel-
dom asked; and if it is, answers are frequently couched in terms that attempt 
to disavow their communicative heritage.
In the Stoic mentality, though, everything is intelligible in virtue of signi-
fier–signified relations. All reality is understood as inherently semiotic and 
comprises, as Berkeley puts it, a natural language of signs (TV 144, 147; 
TVV 40).17 For the Stoics, a natural sign is not a word or an idea that refers 
to some thing apart from itself; for if that were the case, then both sign and 
referent would be intelligible apart from their being related by the signifying 
event.18 Instead, a sign – or more properly, a signifier – has meaning to the 
extent that it is a function within a network of propositions. No thing exists 
or can be conceived apart from that network, because the determination of a 
thing as one thing rather than another depends on its place in that network. 
Such a placement requires that the thing have a case ending and appear in 
propositions that make explicit the mood and tense of the verbs that associate 
it with other things. From this perspective, any attempt to describe a meta-
physics that is not inherently linguistic is bound to fail.19
This is not to say that Stoic semiotics (or Berkeleian ontology) is a ver-
sion of linguistic idealism. For to think in terms of idealism, we would have 
to assume that the distinction between mind and matter can be made without 
acknowledging the unavoidably linguistic conditions in terms of which such 
an assumption is made. If anything, the self-conscious focus on what is most 
immediate in experience accounts, in part, for why Stoicism is often treated 
as a materialist philosophy. And when understood in terms of the substan-
17 Cf. Verbeke 1991, 19-20. 
18 See Todorov 1982, 19-23.
19 See Deleuze 1990, 8-9, 22; Long 1974, 125.
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tialist metaphysics or predicational logic of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, or 
Locke, Stoic doctrines about the materiality of truth or the reality of only 
the present seem to contradict the claim that meanings and the acts by which 
they are determined (lekta) are immaterial. But, as Gilles Deleuze notes, the 
Stoics avoid such apparent contradictions by focusing on the events that in-
scribe the surface of experience.20 Beyond that surface, nothing can exist or 
be known, because even to allude to a beyond is to invoke a concept intel-
ligible only in terms of discursive differentiations.
Here, even the distinctions between word and object, or linguistic sur-
face and referent, are functions of the sensual expressions in terms of which 
things are identified and differentiated. In what Deleuze refers to as this logic 
of sense, “everything that happens and everything that is said happens or 
the surface,” for there is nothing other than the immediate events that intro-
duce sense.21 The Stoics discover sense by recognizing how events establish 
the conditions by which propositions become intelligible (i.e., conditioned). 
Because events are themselves unconditioned, there is no “sense” of an 
event: as Deleuze says, “the event is sense itself and belongs essentially to 
language.”22 The event by which an expression becomes meaningful or sig-
nificant is not linguistic in the sense of being distinct from the proposition 
that expresses either it or the mental state of the pronouncer or the state of 
affairs denoted by the proposition. Rather, the proposition, its intentionality, 
and its object are all intelligible only in terms of the event.
Berkeley’s contemporary, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, puts it this way: 
even to refer to sensual actions or gestures as expressions of a language is 
already to appeal to a language in terms of which the distinction of world, 
thought, and language is itself intelligible.23 This meta-language – for Ber-
keley, this divine speech – is the unconditioned expression of the events 
that establish the conditions for intelligibility. So in the matrix of events 
that form that aboriginal language, the differentiation of objects, ideas, and 
words is not simply accepted as an ontological given. Instead, existence or 
being is understood as intelligible only as a function of the structure of the 
20 See Deleuze 1990, 105, 132-133.
21 See Deleuze 1990, 19, 21, 34, 132.
22 Deleuze 1990, 22; also see 181-184.
23 See Daniel 1990, 195-202; and Derrida 1980, 59-65.
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determinations (or logos) of this discourse. In this logic of propositions, the 
ontological, epistemological, semantic, and affective features that identify, 
distinguish, and relate things in the universe (and thus allow things to make 
sense) are themselves recognized as intelligible only as functions in what the 
Stoics and Berkeley refer to as the book of nature or language of God.
For the Stoics, then, the event in which a proposition is expressed – that 
is, the expression itself – identifies things in relation to one another, thus 
making language and the states of affairs denoted by language meaningful. 
Since propositional terms are intelligible only in virtue of their associations 
with other terms in propositions, their juxtapositions are most properly ex-
pressed as apprehensions (“this A is B”), hypotheticals (“if A, then B”), con-
junctions (“A and B”), or disjunctions (“A or B”). But because everything 
in the universe is intelligible only in terms of such associations, everything 
can legitimately be considered a function of a conditional expression (that is, 
as either a signifier or that which is signified). In this way, a sign is the ante-
cedent that always and necessarily refers to the consequent of a conditional 
proposition. 24 Even though the antecedent is presupposed as the means for 
determining the sense of the consequent, it does not cause the consequent; 
rather, it situates the consequent in a domain of discursive exchange.
By specifying logical (antecedent–consequent) relations through deter-
minate declensions and conjugations, the Stoic wise man thus unites what is 
expressed with what is meant. His pronouncements about the world of caus-
al relations are infallible, in that his pronouncements articulate the ordered 
structure of reality.25 His pronouncements are not “true” (as if there is some 
other standard on which they can be evaluated) as much as they are truth 
itself. He cannot be wrong, because error is possible only where there is an 
ontological discrepancy between what is said and what is meant. Since com-
plete lekta are meaningful in virtue of their being propositionally expressed, 
they cannot be other than what is the case. That is, their case or tense is their 
fate. Only by being made determinate (by fate) can they provide the standard 
on which derivative, predicational thinking is judged as true or false.
24 Cf. Verbeke 1991, 21; Mates 1961, 13n; Gould 1970, 75-82; Deleuze 1990, 69; Kneale and 
Kneale 1962, 141; and Ebert 1987, 85.
25 See Long 1974, 130; Long 1971b, 102; Watson 1966, 42-43, 58.
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In this sense, the expressed associations of things with one another in 
space, time, and experience seem (as Berkeley points out) completely ar-
bitrary and (as the Stoics note) a matter of fate (Alc IV.7; IV.10).26 The lan-
guage of nature they inscribe identifies a thing as intelligible in virtue of its 
place within that matrix of differentiation. But since a thing has a determi-
nate identity only as a function of the discourse that defines intelligibility, it 
(along with everything else) cannot be anything other than what it is. It thus 
discloses a divine rationale or order. That order (logos) is intelligibility itself, 
or simply mind. “Minds” (in the plural) are the means by which the onto-
logical identification of things is manifested in propositional judgments.27 
Through such judgments, minds express the differentiation and association 
of things in the cosmos, but they cannot account for their own differentia-
tion. That is, they cannot account for the strategies by which they originally 
become intelligible: in short, they cannot account for mind itself.
This insight is crucial for understanding how, for the Stoics and Berkeley 
alike, individual minds can be free. To the extent that we see the things we 
experience as parts of a divinely orchestrated harmony, we act according to 
reason and are not led astray by our passions. In this respect, we aspire to 
emulate the Stoic sage – not in the sense that we passively accept fate, but in 
the sense that with more familiarity with the workings of nature, we affirm 
our roles as parts of God’s plan that there be certain, determinate sequences 
of experiences whereby things are differentiated and associated. We thus 
contribute to the on-going creation of the world.
This is why, for the Stoics, mind is not simply another thing that exists 
in the universe. Rather, it is the intelligibility of all things, the invisible fire 
(the pneuma) that differentiates and permeates all parts of the cosmos.28 It is 
the semantic and syntactic order of relations in which all things are united in 
a “universal sympathy” and on which divination and astrological reasoning 
is based. Berkeley picks up on this theme, commenting that “Providence or 
Mind was supposed by [the Stoics] to be immediately resident or present in 
fire, to dwell therein, and to act thereby” (Siris 172; see also 177). Mind is 
the intellectual fire that differentiates all things (Siris 190) and connects all 
26 See Deleuze 1990, 34.
27 See Deleuze 1990, 176; Graeser 1978, 98; Long 1971b, 102; and Lloyd 1978, 237.
28 See Lapidge 1978, 163-170; Hahm 1977, 158-168; Long 1974, 154; and Cléret 1999, 67.
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things (Siris 192) in a wise and provident manner (Siris 272). Berkeley con-
cludes, therefore, that it is wrong to think then that the Stoics thought of this 
fire in a corporeal way, just as it is wrong to think that the Stoics confused 
mind with the system of sensible objects or described God as corporeal (Siris 
323-324).
Berkeley has no problem, then, in saying that the “vegetative soul or vital 
spirit of the world” expressed in the aether or fire that accounts for all mo-
tion and change is corporeal, because in his view (and the view of the Stoics) 
the principle of the motion or change of any determinate body must itself be 
considered corporeal (Siris 152). But that does not mean that the principle 
by which those bodies become determinate is itself corporeal, for that would 
require yet another principle to account for its being determinate. Berkeley 
precludes such an endless regress by acknowledging that, even though the 
motions or changes that identify a body as this or that body must themselves 
be identified in corporeal terms, the principle by which those motions or 
changes themselves come about is not corporeal.
To ask for the cause of this or that body is thus to ask for a specific cause 
of this or that body. Likewise, to ask for the cause of the multiplicity of bod-
ies in the universe is to ask for the specific cause of such multiplicity. In a 
Neoplatonic account, this differentiation would be explained in terms a prior 
differentiation of the ideas of such bodies (e.g., as archetypes in the mind of 
God). But such an account simply delays the question of how divine ideas 
or archetypes are differentiated in the first place; or worse, it subordinates 
the differentiation of divine ideas to the differentiation of bodies without 
explaining how bodies are initially differentiated.29
Berkeley thus appropriates the Stoic strategy for God’s immanence in the 
world by distinguishing the cause of corporeal differentiation (viz., the Stoic 
pneuma or “aethereal spirit”) from the Mind that activates it (Siris 258). 
This is what prompts Berkeley to insist (contra Leibniz) that even though the 
force that accounts for the differentiations and motions of bodies is mind, 
the actual differentiations and movements by which bodies are differentiated 
and related are corporeal (DM 16-18, 20, 34, 42).30 We see the bodies and 
29 Being caught up in the study of the secondary-cause workings of nature can also lead our 
thoughts away from the “governing spirit whose will constitutes the Laws of Nature” (P 32).
30 Cf. Daniel 2007b, 174-175.
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their interactions, but we do not see the boundaries by which those bodies are 
those bodies, or the motions by which those interactions occur. Nonetheless, 
those bodies have limits and do interact, and for Berkeley the only way to 
explain this is in terms of something that is literally aethereal, namely, the 
Stoics’ invisible elementary fire of the cosmos.
My conclusion, then, is that we can think of Berkeley’s discussion of the 
aethereal fire in Siris in a way that is consistent with his earlier doctrines 
about mind and bodies by understanding those remarks in their distinctly 
Stoic context. In that context, the limits and relations of bodies are corporeal 
even though they are invisible; for if we were able to see them, we would see 
them only in terms of the limits and relations by which they are differenti-
ated. To push the principles of such differentiation back into the mind of God 
(as divine ideas or archetypes) is merely to shift the location of the problem; 
for then, the issue turns to how God’s ideas are differentiated (which, of 
course, raises another bugbear of Berkeley scholarship, namely, the relation 
of God’s ideas to our ideas).31 Thankfully, the Stoic strategy of portraying 
individual minds as expressions of God’s benevolent will that there be coor-
dinated sequences of perceptions avoids that problem altogether.
31 See Daniel 2001a, 239-258.
STEPHEN H. DANIEL
153
BiBliograPhy
Algra, K., J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds.) (1999), The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Annas, Julia. (1992), Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, University of California Press, Berke-
ley.
Ariew, Roger and Daniel Garber (eds.) (1989), G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, Hackett, 
Indianapolis. 
Berkeley, George. (1948-1957), The Works of George Berkeley, 9 Vols, A. A. Luce and T. E. 
Jessop (eds), London, Nelson.
Barnouw, Jeffrey. (2008), “The Two Motives Behind Berkeley’s Expressly Unmotivated 
Signs: Sure Preception and Personal Providence,” in Daniel (2008a), pp. 145-177.
Bobzien, Susanne. (2003), “Logic” in Inwood (2003), pp. 85-123.
Bracken, Harry M. (1974), Berkeley, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
Brown, S. and P. Phemister (eds.) (2007), Leibniz and the English-Speaking World, Springer, 
Dordrecht.
Brykman, Geneviève. (2008), “On Human Liberty in Berkeley’s Alciphron VII,” in Daniel 
(2008a), pp. 231-246.
Charles, Sébastien (ed.) (2004), Science et épistémologie selon Berkeley, Presses de 
l’Université Laval, Quebec.
Cléret, Nathalie. (1999), “Paracelse, l’alchimie et les stoïciens: Quelques aspects des concep-
tions stoïciens et paracelsienne du feu,” in Moreau (1999a), pp. 65-76.
Daniel, Stephen H. (1990), Myth and Modern Philosophy, Temple University Press, Phila-
delphia.
Daniel, Stephen H. (2001a), “Berkeley’s Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine 
Ideas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39, pp. 239-258.
Daniel, Stephen H. (2004), “Les limites de la philosophie naturelle de Berkeley,” in Charles 
(2004), pp. 163-170.
Daniel, Stephen H. (ed.) (2007a), Reexamining Berkeley’s Philosophy, University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto.
Daniel, Stephen H. (2007b), “The Harmony of the Leibniz-Berkeley Juxtaposition,” in Brown 
and Phemister (2007), pp. 163-180.
Daniel, Stephen H. (ed.) (2008a), New Interpretations of Berkeley’s Thought, Humanity 
Books, Amherst, NY.
Daniel, Stephen H. (2008b), “Berkeley’s Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance,” in Daniel 
(2008a), 203-230.
Deleuze, Gilles. (1990), The Logic of Sense, C. V. Boundas (ed.), M. Lester and C. Stivale 
(trs.), Columbia University Press, New York.
Derrida, Jacques. (1980), The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, J. P. Leavey, 
Jr. (tr.), Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh.
Ebert, Theodor. (1987), “The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus,” Ox-
ford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5, pp. 83-126.
Forman, David. (2008), “Free Will and the Freedom of the Sage in Leibniz and the Stoics,” 
History of Philosophy Quarterly 25, pp. 203-219.
STOICISM IN BERKELEY’S PHILOSOPHY
154
Frede, Michael. (1999), “Stoic epistemology,” in Algra et al. (1999), pp. 295-322.
Gaukroger, Stephen (ed.) (1991), The Uses of Antiquity: The Scientific Revolution and the 
Classical Tradition, Kluwer, Boston.
Gould, Josiah B. (1970), The Philosophy of Chrysippus, State University of New York Press, 
Albany.
Graeser, Andreas. (1978), “The Stoic Theory of Meaning,” in Rist (1978), pp. 77-100. 
Hahm, David E. (1977), The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, Ohio State University Press, Co-
lumbus.
Hobbes, Thomas. (1656), The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, in 
Molesworth (1839-1845), Vol. 5.
Imbert, Claude. (1980), “Stoic Logic and Alexandrian Poetics,” in Schofield et al. (1980), pp. 
182-216.
Inwood, Brad (ed.) (2003), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge University 
Press, New York.
Jacob, Alexander. (1991), “The Neoplatonic Conception of Nature in More, Cudworth, and 
Berkeley,” in Gaukroger (1991), pp. 101-122.
James, Susan. (1993), “Spinoza the Stoic,” in Sorrell (1993), pp. 289-316.
Kassler, Jamie C. (1991), “The Paradox of Power: Hobbes and Stoic Naturalism,” in Gaukro-
ger (1991), pp. 53-78.
Kneale, William C. and Martha Kneale. (1962), The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.
Kremer, Elmar J. and M. J. Latzer (eds.) (2001), The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Phi-
losophy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Kristeller, Paul O. (1984), “Stoic and Neoplatonic Sources of Spinoza’s Ethics,” History of 
European Ideas 5, pp. 1-15.
Lapidge, Michael. (1978), “Stoic Cosmology,” in Rist (1978), pp. 161-185.
Leduc-Fayette, Denise. (1997), “Qu’est que ‘parler aux yeux’? Berkeley et le ‘langage op-
tique’,” Revue philosophique de la France et l’étranger 122, pp. 409-427.
Leibniz, G. W. (1677-80), “Two Sects of Naturalists,” in Ariew and Garber (1989), pp. 281-
284.
Lloyd, A. C. (1978), “Emotion and Decision in Stoic Psychology,” in Rist (1978), pp. 233-
246.
Long, A. A. (ed.) (1971a), Problems in Stoicism, Athlone Press, London.
Long, A. A. (1971b), “Language and Thought in Stoicism,” in Long (1971a), pp. 75-113.
Long, A. A. (1974), Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, New York.
Long, A. A. (2003), “Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler,” in 
Miller and Inwood (2003), pp. 7-29.
Mates, Benson. (1961), Stoic Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Miller, Jon. (2003), “Stoics, Grotius, and Spinoza on Moral Deliberation,” in Miller and In-
wood (2003), pp. 116-140.
Miller, Jon and Brad Inwood (eds.) (2003), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, Cam-
bridge University Press, New York.
Mitsis, Phillip. (2003), “Locke’s Offices,” in Miller and Inwood (2003), pp. 45-61.
STEPHEN H. DANIEL
155
Moked, Gabriel. (1988), Particles and Ideas: Bishop Berkeley’s Corpuscular Philosophy, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Molesworth, William (ed.) (1839-1945), The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, 11 Vols., 
John Bohn, London.
Moreau, Pierre-François (ed.) (1999a), Le Stoïcisme au XVIe et au XVIIe Siècle: Le retour des 
philosophies antiques à l’Age classique, Albin Michel, Paris.
Moreau, Pierre-François. (1999b), “Les trois étapes du stoïcisme moderne,” in Moreau 
(1999a), pp. 11-27.
Neuchelmans, Gabriel. (1980), Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, 
North Holland, Amsterdam.
Osler, Margaret J. (ed.) (1991), Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes 
in European Thought, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Rist, John M. (ed.) (1978), The Stoics, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Rutherford, Donald. (2001), “Leibniz and the Stoics: The Consolations of Theodicy,” in Kre-
mer and Latzer (2001), pp. 138-164.
Rutherford, Donald. (2003), “Patience sans Espérance: Leibniz’s Critique of Stoicism,” in 
Miller and Inwood (2003), pp. 62-89.
Rutherford, Donald. (2004), “On the Happy Life: Descartes vis-à-vis Seneca,” in Strange and 
Zupko (2004), pp. 177-197.
Schofield, M., M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (eds.) (1980), Doubt and Dogmatism, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford.
Sorrell, Tom (ed.) (1993), The Rise of Modern Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Steven K. Strange, K. Steven, and J. Zupko (eds.) (2004), Stoicism: Traditions and Transfor-
mations, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Todorov, Tzvetan. (1982), Theories of the Symbol, Catherine Porter (tr.), Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY.
Verbeke, Gerard. (1991), “Ethics and Logic in Stoicism,” in Osler (1991), pp. 11-24.
Watson, Gerard. (1966), The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, Queen’s University Press, Belfast.
White, Michael J. (2003), “Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology),” in Inwood 
(2003), pp. 124-152.
STOICISM IN BERKELEY’S PHILOSOPHY
